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COMMENTS
IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT IN A
CORPORATE FAMILY:  THE OVERRELIANCE




The attorney-client privilege is a well-established tenet of law that balances
two competing interests—the need for a disclosure of facts that could lead to
an equitable conclusion in litigation, and the need to protect communications
between counsel and client to promote candid and comprehensive discourse
that could lead to an equitable conclusion in litigation.  The attorney-client
privilege has evolved in time to evade obsolescence.  This Comment discusses
the evolution of the attorney-client privilege in the context of modern corpo-
rate law.
This Comment addresses when it becomes appropriate to extend the privi-
lege between separate corporations that are affiliated by ownership.  Many
courts focus the analysis on the degree of ownership, whether wholly owned,
majority owned, or merely affiliated.  Although the degree of affiliation carries
pronounced import in the analysis, it alone should not be dispositive.  A
proper determination cannot be reached without consideration of other essen-
tial factors and the underlying policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the millennium, a revolutionary method for amassing
a music collection swept across the virtual landscape.  Person-to-per-
son file sharing allowed individuals to exchange digital music files and
increase their own personal collections exponentially and for free.
One name became synonymous with the forum that made this file
sharing all possible: Napster.  It did not take long for the music indus-
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try to attack the file-sharing network for copyright infringement.  Nu-
merous members of the music industry participated in the suits against
Napster,1 including music giant BMG.
In the heat of litigation (approximately September 2000), another
music giant, Bertelsmann AG, invested millions in Napster believing
person-to-person file sharing to be the new direction for music distri-
bution.2  About one year later, the court enjoined Napster from “op-
erating its file-sharing network in a manner that enabled its users to
engage in copyright infringement.”3  Soon afterwards, Napster filed
for bankruptcy; however, litigation did not end with Napster’s demise.
Plaintiffs who could no longer collect from Napster then turned their
sights onto investors, such as Bertelsmann AG, who remained
solvent.4
In 2005, plaintiffs sought to compel Bertelsmann AG to release doc-
uments relating to its decision to invest in Napster.5  Among the docu-
ments requested were communications between Bertelsmann AG and
BMG, which Bertelsmann claimed were protected under the attorney-
client privilege.6  Interestingly, although BMG was an active partici-
pant in the litigation that ultimately drove Napster into bankruptcy,
BMG was also a wholly owned subsidiary of Bertelsmann AG, which
also owned a significant interest in Napster.7
The issue before the court was whether to treat the affiliated corpo-
rations as one entity for purposes of the attorney-client privilege not-
withstanding the apparent conflict of interest.8  Many courts have
extended the intra-corporate attorney-client privilege to communica-
tions between affiliated companies, viewing related companies to be
one entity.9  This practice presents several questions:  What precise
affiliation is required for the privilege to apply?  Should the privilege
be limited to wholly owned subsidiaries?  Should the privilege be
available between corporations with less than a controlling share?  Is
the percentage of ownership dispositive in determining whether to ex-
tend the privilege?
This Comment examines the degree of affiliation that is required
between related corporations to prevent disclosure from becoming a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  Some courts hold that the sub-
sidiary must be wholly owned by the parent company in order to pre-
1. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 2005 WL 6569723 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12,
2005).
2. Napster, BMG in Music Pact, CNNMONEY (Oct. 31, 2000 4:49 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2000/10/31/bizbuzz/napster/index.htm.
3. In re Napster, 2005 WL 6569723, at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *1–3.
8. Id. at *3.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.
2013] ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 165
serve the privilege.  Other courts have lowered the standard of
ownership to majority owned or a controlling share.  And other courts
are willing to preserve the privilege to merely any affiliated
corporations.
The decision in Napster acknowledged that there exists a “weight of
authority” to support extending the privilege to wholly owned subsidi-
aries.10  Nonetheless, the Napster court opined that doing so under the
facts of the current case would be absurd because although related by
complete ownership, each company was seeking a contradictory inter-
est.11  This decision may provide an exception to the trend or perhaps
highlight a flaw in the legal analysis that placed too much emphasis on
the ownership interest between corporations.
This Comment will begin with a brief discussion about the history of
the attorney-client privilege and its adaptation to the corporate set-
ting.  This history is presented through three landmark cases that track
the evolution of the privilege.  This Comment will then provide exam-
ples of courts narrowing the analysis of whether or not to extend the
privilege solely on the degree of affiliation between corporations.
Next, the Comment will discuss a United States Third Circuit Court of
Appeals opinion that did not dispose of the issue through mere affilia-
tion, but instead, the court resorted to an extensive analysis via several
related doctrines.  Finally, this Comment concludes that a thorough
examination considers all relevant factors, and degree of affiliation is
but one of these factors.
II. BRIEF HISTORY
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privi-
leges in Anglo-American jurisprudence.12  “Dean Wigmore teaches
that the history of the attorney-client privilege finds its origin in the
reign of Elizabeth I, ‘where the privilege already appears as unques-
tioned.’”13  The rule “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest
and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge
of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure.”14
Courts recognize that the attorney-client privilege presents a com-
promise between two competing interests:  (1) the need for full disclo-
sure as a truth finding mechanism, and (2) the need to protect the
relationship between clients and their counsel to foster uninhibited
communications, which furthers the administration of justice.15  “The
10. In re Napster, 2005 WL 6569723, at *5.
11. Id. at *4.
12. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1963).
13. Id.
14. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
15. See generally id.
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social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of
lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that
may come from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.”16
A. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the United States
filed an anti-trust action against the United Shoe Machinery Corp.
(United Shoe).17  The government sought to compel discovery of cer-
tain documents that United Shoe claimed were protected under the
attorney-client privilege.  The documents at issue included letters that
were sent to attorneys for the corporation or sent by attorneys for the
corporation.18  Through these letters, the attorneys were not only
communicating with direct employees but also with employees of the
corporation’s subsidiary and affiliate companies.19  The purpose of
these communications was primarily to solicit legal advice or provide
legal services.20
Other documents at issue were circulated through the corporation’s
patent department.21  Some employees in the patent department were
members of the bar, but not all of these attorneys were licensed to
practice in Massachusetts.22  Other employees assigned to the patent
department and included in the chain of communications were not
attorneys.23  Many of the actual attorneys were found to be function-
ing more as business managers than as legal advisors.24
The U.S. District Court of Massachusetts laid out the elements that
must be satisfied for the attorney-client privilege to apply:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the commu-
nication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opin-
ion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal pro-
ceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.25
16. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 359.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 361.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 360.
25. Id. at 358–59.
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The district court then extended the attorney-client privilege to the
corporate setting while emphasizing that the issue might turn on iden-
tifying the “client.”26
Identifying the “client” is an essential step in every attorney-client
privilege analysis.  The district court held that United Shoe and all its
subsidiaries and affiliates, were clients for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege.27  In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that
each entity shared the same legal counsel and that their legal affairs
were closely related.28
The court then separated the communications at issue into four
classes: “(1) those to or from independent lawyers; (2) those to or
from defendant’s legal department; (3) those to or from defendant’s
patent department; and (4) working papers of persons in the patent
department.”29  First, the court found a significant distinction between
in-house counsel and contracted law firms and extended the privilege
since the communications at issue met the privilege requirements.30
Next, the court held that the communications involving the patent of-
fice were primarily for business purposes rather than legal purposes
and therefore failed to satisfy the privilege qualifications.31
The court gave little consideration to the precise degree of affilia-
tion between corporations for the purpose of extending the privilege.
Instead, the court acknowledged that affiliation by ownership and a
common legal interest was enough to prevent shared communications
from becoming per se waivers.  The court focused its analysis on the
purpose of the communications to determine whether the privilege
should apply and reaffirmed that the privilege applies only to legal
communications and not business communications.  It is not entirely
clear whether the court held that affiliation was a requisite in ex-
tending the privilege across related companies.  But affiliation be-
tween companies did appear to support a finding that the affiliated
companies were essentially a single client.
B. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association
Some courts resisted extending the attorney-client privilege to the
corporate setting.  In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Associa-
tion,32 protracted anti-trust litigation prompted the district court to es-
tablish a pretrial discovery schedule.33  This schedule allowed the
26. Id. at 360–61.
27. Id. at 359.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 360.
31. Id.
32. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. Ill.),
adhered to, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev’d, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
33. Radiant Burners, 207 F. Supp. at 772.
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court to review documents sought by one party but claimed as pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege by the other party.34  The
district court reviewed a flood of documents in deciding which were
protected and which should be disclosed, but then stopped eight let-
ters short of completion.35  The district court noted that
“[c]onsideration of these documents has provided a welcome opportu-
nity to research and reconsider the general field of attorney-client
privilege.”36  The district court held that the attorney-client privilege
could only be claimed by natural persons, and that corporations were
not entitled to the privilege.37
The district court found support for its holding in two principles.
First, “The attorney-client privilege, analogous to the privilege against
self-incrimination, is historically and fundamentally personal in na-
ture.”38  In other words, just as with the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, only natural persons (and not corporations) could invoke the
attorney-client privilege.39  Second, the corporate structure would
broaden the scope of the privilege to an impermissible level.40  Poten-
tially, every member of the company (including shareholders) could
invoke the privilege and conceal all corporate activity in a veil of se-
crecy.41  Specifically, the court stated:
If an individual is not permitted to make an agent of still another
individual, or more accurately of large groups of individuals, and
thus increase the scope of the protection afforded to him through
the attorney-client privilege and ‘profane’ its confidence why permit
a corporation to do the same thing through normal corporate
operations?42
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the
lower court’s opinion that corporations could not claim the attorney-
client privilege.43  The court of appeals acknowledged the lower
court’s admonition but rejected these principles, emphasizing that
“the privilege would never be available to allow a corporation to fun-
nel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers for custo-
dial purposes and thereby avoid disclosure.”44  Similar to the opinion
in United Shoe Machinery Corp., the court here further stressed that








41. Id. at 774.
42. Id.
43. Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
44. Id.
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gal matters, not business matters.45  The court was clear not to create
a blanket privilege and emphasized that confidentiality would be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.46  In a sense, the court acknowl-
edged that proper analysis of the communications at issue takes
priority over the particulars of a company’s affiliation with another
company.
C. Upjohn Co. v. United States
Concern that the complicated corporate structure would permit all
employees to avail themselves of the intra-corporate attorney-client
privilege on behalf of the corporation led to the “control group test”
as a means to narrow the privilege.47  In City of Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against
the defendant for withholding communications requested through in-
terrogatories.48  The communications under debate were between an
employee and in-house counsel.49  A key fact that guided the court’s
ruling was that in communicating with the employee, the in-house at-
torney informed the employee that their communication might have
to be disclosed to company management.50  The court used this state-
ment to differentiate the employee’s role with the corporation to a
position strictly outside of management, or rather, outside of a posi-
tion of control.51
In analyzing the argument, the district court first acknowledged that
for the privilege to attach, the employee must embody the
corporation:52
[W]as he at the time, in contemplation of law, the corporation seek-
ing advice? If not, then he was giving the lawyer information in or-
der that the latter could advise a client other than himself. In such
case the employee is merely a witness and I think that Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, settles the question
that a statement given by a witness to a lawyer who is collecting
information in order to prepare for litigation pending against the
lawyer’s client is not privileged.53
In other words, an employee speaking to her employer’s counsel on
legal matters who is not representative of the corporation is merely a
witness, not a client.54
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
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The Westinghouse court held that employees who are “in a position
to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attor-
ney” or are members of the group which has that authority, in es-
sence, personify the corporation.55  The control group test rejected the
broad view proposed in United Shoe and limited the attorney-client
privilege to a small controlling class of employees within the
corporation.56
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, Upjohn was a pharmaceutical manu-
facturer operating internationally.57  In-house counsel for the corpora-
tion learned that one of Upjohn’s foreign subsidiaries made
potentially illegal payments to foreign government officials in ex-
change for government business.58  Upjohn’s attorneys quickly initi-
ated an internal investigation to ascertain the company’s involvement
in bribing the foreign bureaucrats.59  As part of the investigation, in-
house counsel sent a questionnaire to all managers of Upjohn’s for-
eign subsidiaries requesting information about these possible pay-
ments.60  The managers completed the questionnaires and returned
them to Upjohn’s in-house counsel.61
Upjohn’s attorneys prepared a report based partly on the question-
naires, and partly on interviews of the foreign subsidiary managers
conducted by both in-house and outside counsel.62  This report was
released voluntarily and utilized by the United States Internal Reve-
nue Service to instigate another investigation into the matter, this time
regarding the tax consequences of bribing foreign officials.63  The In-
ternal Revenue Service filed a motion to compel discovery of the ac-
tual questionnaires that were only used to generate the report, but not
included in the report.64  Upjohn refused to disclose the question-
naires, claiming that the communications were protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.65
The district court held that the attorney-client privilege had been
waived and ordered production of the questionnaires.66  On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Upjohn never waived the
privilege, but nonetheless it could not avail itself of the privilege be-
cause of its failure to satisfy the control group test.67  The Sixth Circuit
55. Id.
56. Id. at 485.
57. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
58. Id. at 386.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 386–87.
61. Id. at 387.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 387–88.
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 388–89.
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ruled that the attorney-client privilege did not apply “[t]o the extent
that the communications were made by officers and agents not re-
sponsible for directing [petitioner’s] actions in response to legal advice
. . . for the simple reason that the communications were not the
‘client’s.’”68
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the scope of
the well-established attorney-client privilege and its freshly avowed
role in the corporate setting.69  Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the control group test on two grounds.  First, the Court used
the following language to lay out the first ground:
The control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates
the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communica-
tion of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys
seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. The attor-
ney’s advice will also frequently be more significant to noncontrol
group members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and
the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and
frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the cli-
ent corporation’s policy.70
Second, the Court noted that the control group test is difficult to
apply in practice and would yield varying results across the lower
courts.71  The Supreme Court went on to note that managers, assistant
managers, vice presidents, and members of different departments
within a corporation have received different treatment among the
courts.72  The impact of this uncertainty directly affects the nature of
the relationship the privilege was designed to champion.73  The ad-
ministration of justice is severely weakened when attorneys and their
clients cannot predict what communications will be privileged.74
In conclusion, the Court observed that Federal Rule of Evidence
501 requires reverence to common law75 and that determinations be
made on a case-by-case basis.76  Nonetheless, the Court held that the
control group test was impermissibly narrow and inconsistent with the
principals of the common law attorney-client privilege.77
III. DISCUSSION
The courts have long accepted the attorney-client privilege as a nec-
essary compromise in our legal system, with candid discourse between
68. Id. at 383.
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id. at 392.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 393.
73. See generally id. at 392–93.
74. Id. at 393.
75. FED. R. EVID. 501.
76. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
77. Id. at 397.
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client and counsel on one side and freedom of information on the op-
posing side.  After a brief period of deliberation, the doctrine was offi-
cially made available to corporations to the same extent it was
available to individuals, “no more and no less.”78  Courts also agree
that disclosure of confidential information to non-privileged third par-
ties constitutes a waiver of the privilege.79  Such disclosure led to the
intra-corporate decisions regarding the control group test and its sub-
sequent rejection by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Upjohn decision
reinforced the sanctity of intra-corporate confidentiality but left intact
the qualifications for privilege that prevented the feared “‘zone of si-
lence’ over corporate affairs.”80
A. Exceptions to Waiver by Third Party Disclosure: In re
Teleglobe Communications Corp.
A brief synopsis of what constitutes a waiver and exceptions to such
a waiver will facilitate a discussion regarding the tendency in some
courts to decide intra-corporate waiver issues based on degrees of af-
filiation.  The concept of waiver applies when a communication is in-
tentionally disclosed to a third party who does not share in the
confidential relationship.81  Such disclosure is said to constitute a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege because if a communication was
intended to be confidential it would not be disclosed so liberally.82
Following this logic, communications between members of the same
client group are not waivers.  Therefore, it becomes essential to distin-
guish between clients and third parties.  Three theories dominate in
the analysis of determining who qualifies as a client: (1) Related Com-
panies Theory, (2) Community of Interest Theory, and (3) Common
Defense Theory.83
The Related Companies Theory states that affiliated companies are
essentially one client.84  As such, communications between counsel
and affiliated companies are tantamount to communications directly
between counsel and client.  Under this theory, as long as the other
elements of confidentiality are satisfied, the privilege may cross corpo-
rate lines.  Pairing the Related Companies Theory with the Upjohn
78. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
79. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950) (“without the presence of strangers”); see also In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.,
493 F.3d 345, 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]f persons other than the client, its attorney, or
their agents are present, the communication is not made in confidence, and the privi-
lege does not attach.”).
80. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (“zone of silence” referred to a belief that corpora-
tions could use the attorney-client privilege to protect most or all communications
from discovery).
81. In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 361.
82. Id.
83. See infra Part III.B, The Focus on Related Companies.
84. See infra Part III.B, The Focus on Related Companies.
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decision (nullifying the control group test) creates an extremely broad
category that cloaks several types of communication under the attor-
ney-client privilege that would otherwise require production.  Under
this concept, application of the privilege would turn on the definition
of “affiliated companies” or the degree of affiliation between compa-
nies.  The following case demonstrates the two other dominant theo-
ries that preserve the privilege when communications are disclosed
between affiliated companies.
In In re Teleglobe Communications, Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE)
owned a 23% share in Teleglobe.85  In 2000, BCE purchased all re-
maining shares of Teleglobe, anticipating the development of a fiber
optic network called GlobeSystem.86  Under the direction of BCE,
Teleglobe and its subsidiaries borrowed $2.4 billion in furtherance of
the GlobeSystem project.87  One year later the funds were ex-
hausted.88  In April 2001, BCE publicized its lack of confidence in
GlobeSystem by cutting off funding to Teleglobe, sending Teleglobe
into bankruptcy.89
Teleglobe’s subsidiaries and creditors filed suit against BCE and
sought the release of communications between BCE and Teleglobe.90
BCE argued that these communications were privileged because they
occurred between BCE attorneys and pertinent employees of
Teleglobe and its subsidiaries regarding a common legal interest.91
In analyzing the claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals drew a
sharp distinction between the joint-client privilege and the common-
interest privilege.92  The joint-client (or co-client) privilege holds that
an attorney may serve multiple clients on the same matter as long as
the attorney can fulfill his duty to each joint client.93  Communications
between joint-clients and their common counsel are privileged, so
long as the other elements of the privilege are satisfied.94
The common-interest (or community of interest) privilege devel-
oped in criminal law as courts recognized that it was sounder to allow
co-defendants with separate counsel to coordinate their defenses.95
This doctrine expanded into civil law allowing protection of communi-
cations within a “community of interest.”96  The court noted two key
features of the privilege.  First, it is the attorneys within the commu-




89. Id. at 354.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 359.
93. Id. at 362.
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 363–64.
96. Id.
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nity of interest who must share the communication.97  Communication
between members might not be privileged.98  Second, all members of
the community must share a common legal interest in the communica-
tion.99  The key distinction between the two doctrines is that joint-
clients share the same legal counsel while parties invoking a commu-
nity of interest privilege each have separate counsel.100
The Third Circuit observed that although courts generally agree
that communications between affiliated companies should be treated
as intra-corporate communications, they do so for varying reasons.101
The court noted three arguments commonly put forth:  “(1) the mem-
bers of the corporate family comprise one client, (2) the members of
the corporate family are joint clients, and (3) the members of the cor-
porate family are in a community of interest with one another.”102
The court preferred founding its analysis on the view that corporate
families are joint clients because “[t]his reflects both the separateness
of each entity and the reality that they are all represented by the same
in-house counsel.”103  The court held that treating affiliated compa-
nies as one client is most conceivable when the subsidiary is wholly
owned by the parent.104  But even then, doing so fails to observe the
“bedrock principle of corporate law . . . that courts must respect entity
separateness unless doing so would work inordinate inequity.”105
The court rejected the Community of Interest Doctrine because it
“only comes into play when parties are represented by separate coun-
sel, which is often not the case for parents and subsidiaries.”106  Fur-
thermore, “it assumes too much to think that members of a corporate
family necessarily have a substantially similar legal interest . . . in all of
each other’s communications.”107
B. The Focus on Related Companies
Although early decisions about the attorney-client privilege and its
application to the corporate setting paid little consideration to the de-
gree of affiliation between related companies, many modern courts
seem to hinge their decisions on the parent corporation’s ownership
interest in the subsidiary.  Many of these decisions appear to turn on
whether the subsidiaries were wholly owned by the parent corpora-




101. Id. at 370.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 372.
104. Id. at 370.
105. Id. at 371.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id.
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tions.  This hefty reliance on ownership interest can be misleading in
light of the early cases.
In Fox v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,108 the district court ruled that dis-
closure of confidential communications between affiliated companies
did not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.109  Massey-
Ferguson (MF) was an agriculture equipment manufacturer with in-
ternational reach and over 150 years of being in business.110  In the
1960s, MF was the third largest farm machinery company in the
United States and the largest across the rest of the world.111  In 1964,
MF implemented a free health care insurance benefit to retired em-
ployees via a collective bargaining agreement with the United Auto
Workers Association.112
MF was subsequently purchased by Varity Corporation
(“Varity”).113  In 1993, Varity unilaterally modified the retirement
health care benefit, which prompted a law suit seeking injunction of
the modification.114  Prior to annulling the health care benefit, MF’s
counsel prepared a Litigation Risk Analysis that contained (1) confi-
dential communications between Varity and its counsel; (2) legal
advice to Varity, MF, and Kelsey-Hayes115 regarding possible modifi-
cations to retirement benefits; (3) advice on legal strategies for antici-
pated legislation; and (4) “a numerical evaluation (1 to 5) of the
probability of success in litigation brought by various groups of former
employees.”116
During litigation, MF produced documents in response to a discov-
ery request by the plaintiffs.117  The Litigation Risk Analysis was inad-
vertently included among those documents.118  Upon realizing the
mistake, MF filed a motion to have the Litigation Risk Analysis re-
turned.119  The plaintiffs resisted the motion, arguing that disclosure
of the Litigation Risk Analysis to Varity and Kelsey-Hayes constituted
a waiver of the privilege.120  The court rejected this argument:
The Plaintiffs contend that privilege was waived when the docu-
ments were shared between Kelsey-Hayes, Massey-Ferguson, and
108. Fox v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
109. Id. at 670.
110. Massey Ferguson, Our Heritage, Overview, MASSEYFERGUSON, http://www
.masseyferguson.us/about_us/mf-history/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
111. Massey Ferguson, Our Heritage, 60s, MASSEYFERGUSON, http://www.mas-
seyferguson.us/about%5Fus/mf%2Dhistory/60s/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
112. Fox v. Varity Corp., 91 F.3d 143 (6th Cir. 1996) (not designated for
publication).
113. Fox, 172 F.R.D. at 657.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 668 (Kelsey-Hayes is another subsidiary of Varity).
116. Id. at 670.
117. Id. at 668.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 669.
120. Id. at 670.
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Towers Perrin.121 They claim . . . that “the very fact that these legal
opinions were shared between the two separate corporations consti-
tutes a waiver of the privilege.” This argument has no merit and is
problematic for several reasons. First, Massey-Ferguson and Kelsey-
Hayes are not two separate corporations. Massey-Ferguson is a divi-
sion of Varity, which fully owns Kelsey-Hayes. It is well settled that
a privilege is not waived by communications which extend through-
out a corporate structure that encompasses a parent corporation,
subsidiaries, and affiliates.122
The Fox court concluded that MF, Varity, and Kelsey-Hayes were all
part of one corporate entity and therefore, one client.123  The court
also mentioned that privilege in this matter would have been pre-
served by the common-interest exception to waiver.124  But this excep-
tion did not appear to influence the court’s initial ruling, which was
based solely on affiliation.125
In Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work,126 the district court decided
an issue of confidentiality based on alternate theories of exceptions to
waiver including the related companies’ exception.127  Lladro S.A. was
a Spanish company that manufactured porcelain figurines according
to design specifications provided by Disenos Artisticos E Industriales
S.A. (DAISA), another Spanish corporation.128  Weil Ceramics &
Glass, Inc. (Weil) was a New Jersey-based importer and distributor of
these figurines.129  All three corporations were wholly owned by a
Spanish corporation, Sodigei S.A.130
In 1983, DAISA filed suit against the defendants claiming copyright
infringement.131  The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging anti-
trust violations for restricting the sale of Lladro figurines.132  During
litigation, defendants sought documents including communications be-
tween the related corporations.133  The court acknowledged privilege
between the corporations named in the litigation, and as such the
common-interest and joint-defense theories protected the communi-
cation.  Going one step further, the court also addressed the Related
Companies Theory as a “factual matter.”134





126. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work, 110 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
127. Id.





133. Id. at 502.
134. Id. at 503.
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The court noted that the three corporations, which exchanged docu-
ments, shared common ownership and were therefore related compa-
nies.135  “[T]he attorney-client protection provided for corporate
clients includes, the corporation who retained an attorney, its parent,
and its wholly owned and majority owned  subsidiaries considered col-
lectively.”136  This statement implies that less than majority owned
subsidiaries may not fall under the umbrella of related companies.
The court in Crabb v. KFC National Management Co.,137 seems to
take the most liberal approach to treating intra-corporate communica-
tions as inter-corporate communications.  Wetonah Crabb worked in
KFC’s payroll department.138  Crabb was a section leader tasked with
identifying and correcting mistakes made by other payroll employ-
ees.139  Crabb believed that management had targeted another payroll
employee (Betty Roush, 62 years of age) for termination, partly based
on her age.140
Rather than follow management’s course, Crabb refused to docu-
ment Roush’s performance deficiencies; instead, she notified Roush of
management’s intent and advised her to take sick leave until her pen-
sion vested.141  Roush took Crabb’s advice and allowed her pension to
vest while on sick leave.142  Upon Roush’s return, she resigned at the
recommendation of management.143
During this time, Crabb had difficulties of her own.  Crabb depleted
all of her preapproved leave time to care for her sick daughter and, as
a result, attempted to negotiate with management for more time
off.144  After Crabb declined to accept a leave of absence with no
guaranty of a job upon her return, she was given more time off with
the stipulation that she return by a certain date or her employment
would be terminated.145  Crabb did not return by that date and she
was fired.146
Crabb and Roush each filed lawsuits against KFC.147  Roush filed
suit for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and Crabb claimed that she was terminated in retaliation
for assisting Roush, which is also an ADEA violation.148  The trial
135. Id.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Crabb v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., No. 91-5474, 1992 WL 1321 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,
1992) (per curiam, not designated for publication).
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court awarded Roush $150,000 but gave Crabb nothing.149  Crabb ap-
pealed, claiming that the trial court erred by not admitting a docu-
ment ruled to be confidential.150
Crabb sought admission of a memorandum created by KFC’s legal
department.151 Intended for supervisory personnel, this memo indi-
cated a need for proper documentation of performance faults for em-
ployees who were slated to be terminated.152  The document
contained a notation made by KFC’s legal counsel recommending that
a copy of the document should be delivered to Zantigo, an affiliated
company of KFC.153  Crabb argued that disclosure of the document to
Zantigo, an outside corporation, constituted a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.154  The Sixth Circuit used the language from the dis-
trict court in its analysis:
[T]he simple distribution of legal advice to similarly-situated deci-
sion makers at affiliated companies would not constitute a waiver of
the confidentiality of the document. It is well settled that attorney-
client privilege is not waived merely because the communications
involved extend across corporate structures to encompass parent
corporations, subsidiary corporations, and affiliated corpora-
tions. . . . (“Although an interest of a third party corporation from a
commercial standpoint would not establish a sufficient community
of interest, the fact that the communications are among formally
different corporate entities which are under common ownership or
control leads this court to treat such inter-related corporate commu-
nications in the same manner as intra-corporate communica-
tions.”). . . .155
Even though a community of interest did not exist, because Zantigo
was not a party to this litigation the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s ruling that such communication between
affiliated companies did not constitute disclosure.156  The Sixth Circuit
joined the Fox court and the Weil Ceramics courts in relying heavily
on mere corporate affiliation to determine whether the attorney-client
privilege should apply.  This shallow analysis fails to consider the im-
port of other factors that arguably outweigh affiliation between corpo-
rations.  In spite of this hefty reliance on affiliation, none of these
courts addressed the issue of, specifically, what minimum degree of
affiliation would condone extending the attorney-client privilege.  The





153. Id. at *3 (Zantigo and KFC were sister corporations, as each was wholly
owned by the same parent corporation).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d
1486, 1493 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
156. Id.
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C. United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
In an extremely complex antitrust action involving numerous facets
of law, the district court for the District of Columbia adopted guide-
lines regarding the law of privilege.157  In Guideline Number Eight,
the court ruled that for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege,
the “client” included the named defendants and all wholly owned sub-
sidiaries as well as majority owned subsidiaries.158  Minority owned
subsidiaries and formerly affiliated companies were expressly ex-
cluded from status as “clients” for privilege purposes.159  However,
the court acknowledged that “[t]he privilege also applies when an at-
torney provides legal advice or assistance to another agency if the ad-
vice or assistance is on a basis that is confidential among the clients
and relates to a matter in which the agencies have a substantial iden-
tity of legal interest.”160
In the comment to Guideline Number Eight, the court elaborated
on its ruling.  First, the court recognized that a great weight of author-
ity holds that a corporate client includes “not only the corporation by
whom the attorney is employed or retained, but also parent, subsidi-
ary, and affiliate corporations.”161  Second, the court stated that it
could find no cases where the degree of affiliation was a requirement
in assessing the parent, subsidiary, or affiliate corporate relation-
ship.162  Third, the court noted that in all the cases where the identity
of the “client” was at issue, the related corporations shared a substan-
tial common legal interest in the matter in controversy.163   In these
cases, even though the corporations were separate entities, the legal
representation was common or joint and therefore still covered by the
attorney-client privilege.164
The court held that the degree of affiliation between the corpora-
tions becomes irrelevant when the claimant can establish that the dis-
tinct entities had a significant common legal interest.  But when this
common legal interest is lacking, then the privilege may turn on the
degree of affiliation.165
The court applied these guidelines to the facts of the case and held
that the wholly owned and majority owned subsidiaries “have close
and long-standing relationships with each other, although they differ
as to the legal significance of that intimacy.”166  As such, those entities
157. United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1979).
158. Id. at 616 (named defendants were American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
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should be considered as a single client for the purposes of the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Regarding the companies in which the American Telephone and
Telegraph Corp. (AT&T) owned a minority interest, the court held
that since “AT&T’s interest in no case exceeds 30 percent, a position
that has been virtually unchanged for at least 20 years. . . . These com-
panies appear to have an autonomous corporate life of their own and,
therefore, should be treated as independent of AT&T.”167  However,
the attorney-client privilege may still apply where legal representation
was shared with respect to a substantial common legal interest.168
The court went on to say that in deciding whether disclosure to an
affiliated company constitutes a waiver, it is proper to consider the
percentage of ownership:169
The cases referring to parent, subsidiary, and affiliate corporations
in regard to the attorney-client privilege simply reach the conclusion
that there was a single client without examining this question. Per-
haps the conclusion to be reached may well depend on where one
begins. If analysis begins with the proposition that corporations
under unified control are “one” even though comprised of compo-
nents held in varying degrees of ownership, then a minority owned
company can be assimilated to one in which substantial, although
not majority, ownership is held. On the other hand, if analysis be-
gins with the proposition that formerly distinct corporations are sep-
arate persons except as specific legal purpose warrants treating
them as one, then a different conclusion is reached.170
IV. CONCLUSION
From the inception of the attorney-client privilege, courts have rec-
ognized the logical tenet that only those communications intended to
be confidential are eligible for protection under the privilege.  From
this tenet comes the rational deduction that disclosure to parties
outside of the confidential relationship presents a waiver, since a com-
munication intended to be confidential would not be disseminated to
non-privileged parties.  This led to the debate over which parties are
non-privileged.  The early cases first acknowledged that communica-
tions within the same corporation could remain confidential if they
were intended to be confidential.  The emphasis was on the communi-
cation, not the relationship.  A communication between attorney and
client is not per se confidential.  Only those communications that are
legal in nature and otherwise satisfy the conditions of the privilege are
protected from forced disclosure.
167. Id. at 616–17.
168. Id. at 617.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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As courts made more and more references to “wholly owned” sub-
sidiaries, the focus seemed to shift from the communication to the re-
lationship.  The relationship aspect of the analysis is essential but only
because it helps distinguish between who is a client and who is a third
party.  Blindly extending the attorney-client privilege to related cor-
porations merely because they are affiliated not only transcends the
boundary of the underlying policy but also violates the theory of en-
tity separateness.
The concept of entity separateness requires that individual corpora-
tions be treated as individual corporations.  After all, creating subsidi-
aries is a strategic business decision that carries many benefits that
extend beyond limiting liability.  Relying on mere affiliation to guard
communications as confidential creates a benefit that was not in-
tended in the corporate structure and in fact, expressly condemned.
The Upjohn trial court warned of creating a “zone of silence” where
corporations could conceal virtually any communication.  Although
the U.S. Supreme Court eventually reversed the trial court’s ruling,
the Supreme Court recognized the admonition against the corporate
“zone of silence.”
The Third Circuit in Teleglobe provided an extraordinary analysis
relative to the process employed by previous courts that settled the
privilege issue without delving into the intricacies of the communica-
tions at issue.  Notably, the Third Circuit conceded that in most cases
where the subsidiary corporation is wholly owned or majority owned
by the parent, the requisite factors will weigh in favor of extending the
privilege.  But this alone is not dispositive of the issue:
[Although] parent companies often centralize the provision of legal
services to the entire corporate group in one in-house legal depart-
ment, it is important to consider how the disclosure rule affects the
sharing of information among corporate affiliates. Recognizing that
any other result would wreak havoc on corporate counsel offices,
courts almost universally hold that intra-group information sharing
does not implicate the disclosure rule. This result is unquestionably
correct. The cases, however, vary in how they reach the result.171
Although the Third Circuit in Teleglobe expressed its preference to
analyze privilege issues between affiliated companies as if they were
joint clients, a more precise framework can be extracted from the ra-
tionale behind the decision.
First, communications between wholly owned subsidiaries and their
parents should be treated as one client unless doing so will violate the
principle of separateness.  This inverts the principle that separate com-
panies should be treated as separate entities unless doing so would
work an inequity.  But in matters of attorney-client privilege, an over-
whelming number of courts already treat these communications as in-
171. In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
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tra-corporate.  Creating a per se rule to this effect would violate the
bedrock principle of separateness.  Inverting the doctrine as suggested
gives the courts leeway to decide issues on a case-by-case basis and
allows courts to make equitable decisions such as in Napster.
The Third Circuit grounded its decision on the notion that most af-
filiated companies share common legal counsel and should therefore
be treated as joint clients in determining if the privilege extends.  In-
stead of making this assumption and creating a blanket rule that
would consume all privilege analysis between related companies,
courts should allow for two more rules that turn on legal
representation.
If the affiliated companies share the same legal counsel, then courts
should apply the joint-client doctrine to determine if communications
between companies constituted a waiver of the privilege.  If the affili-
ated companies each have separate counsel, then courts should apply
the community of interest doctrine to determine if communications
between companies constituted a waiver.
Applying this framework, it becomes apparent that any percentage
of ownership between corporations may give rise to the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, so long as the other elements of privilege are met.  The
policy that supports treating wholly owned subsidiaries and parent
corporations as one entity applies with any percentage of ownership
entailing a controlling share.
Evaluating inter-corporate communications for attorney-client priv-
ilege is grounded in two related doctrines: (1) the nature of the intra-
corporate attorney-client privilege, and (2) the relationship between
the companies as it pertains to a common legal defense.  Both doc-
trines are employed when courts open the door to the attorney-client
privilege based on any level of affiliation and then analyze the com-
munications under the prescribed framework.
The Napster court reached an equitable decision without having to
rely on such shrewd legal analysis.  The Napster court simply found
that corporations should not be entitled to the benefits of separate-
ness when playing on both sides of litigation.  Bertelsmann AG had a
financial stake in Napster and wholly owned BMG, which was in-
volved in the litigation against Napster.  The court acknowledged that
under normal circumstances the communications between
Bertelsmann AG and BMG would be privileged, but to allow such a
result under these circumstances would result in injustice.  The Nap-
ster court found support in the doctrine of separateness without need
for a lengthy Teleglobe-style analysis.  Whichever approach is utilized,
the degree of affiliation between corporations should not be viewed as
a secure gateway to the attorney-client privilege.
